J. E. Pournelle
12051 Laurel Terrace
Studio City, CA 91604
213-762-2256

November 18, 1980

Dr. Francis X. Kane
Director of Plans
TRW

Dear Duke,

        The enclosed is a sermon to the choir, I suppose, but it does
incorporate a fairly powerful if somewhat surprising concensus among
lots of people with diverse views.  All unofficial, of course; but
some highly placed people at Boeing, JPL, MIT, and other places have
bought off on the idea that the space ops facility is the way to go.
Even the JPL black box unmanned space boys go along (provided, of
course, that they get their Halley mission, but what the hell, they
deserve it, and it will be pretty; and although it won't happen before
1984, if we want space to help whoever is in the White House from
84-88 we have to plant some time bombs right now.)

        The arguments  in this  aren't bad,  and might  help  persuade
someone.  In addition:  this will be  published sometime this  spring.
At the same  time, the Star  Trek people will  start their  incredible
mail machine going,  to churn out  letters to Congress  and the  White
House; friendly letters, not hostile, but expressing support of  space
in general and Starbase One in particular.

        The Boeing people tell me that if Boeing, Grumman, and
Rockwell got together they could build the space ops facility about
three to four years from the time Shuttle goes operational.  They
could incorporate some of the Shuttle tanks, too, which would look
like it saved a lot of money, even if structure isn't the real
problem.  Certainly those tanks should be useful in orbit; ANYTHING in
orbit is useful if you intend to stay in space.  We'd need a kind of
space tug to give the tanks a kick in the apogee, but it shouldn't be
all that hard to get several of them together; at least the JPL
computer boys say they don't see it as all that difficult, provided
you've got some kind of pushpot to give the tanks delta vee.  I've
left those details out of the paper, of course.
        However, there's no reason why this can't be done with people
with the right stuff; that is, with a bit of heroism.  A Shuttle
external tank put in orbit holds 22 PSI.  Pressurized to maybe ten or
twelve, it could contain an inflatable base that is pressurized to
14.7, using air.  The Shuttle tank provides a margin of safety, and
some protection from micro-meteorites.
        It's pretty.  It looks as if we're saving lots of money.
Hell, we are saving some money.  And it gets the heroes out there
again, and gives the kids somebody to look up to, and don't kid
yourself that we don't need some of that just now.
        There's a lot of technology that needs to be developed. See
the appendix for some of what I thought of.
        My strongest recommendation is that we really do set up the
Pajaro Dunes study group on a regular basis.  There should be a couple
of changes in personnel, but in general that was an excellent group,
with a good balance between dreamers and hardheads.  It included
Marvin Minsky, John Pierce (Chief Technologist at JPL), Roy Smelt
(retired Chief Scientist fro Lockheed) and a fairly notable group of
others.  It was run by Santa Clara, with Bob Cannon of Stanford as
Chairman.  Cannon was a good chairman.  I think he's a Democrat, but
that never got into the study; meaning that for a job like this, he's
a very good Democrat indeed.
        I think NASA got more than its money's worth (cost was
transportation, room and board, and the princely sum of $183/day for
some of us; some were NASA and unpaid; and several really brilliant
Cal Tech and MIT grad students got expenses only and were happy to
have that).  The study group seems definitely worth while.
        Incidentally, the Study Group can also stay in communication
year round through the ARPA net; it costs very little to give each an
account on an MIT machine, and one suspects that those few of the
group who don't have terminals or access to same can afford to buy
their own.
        Anyway: I think my paper might be worth passing on upstairs to
General Schriever, and possibly to Mr. Reagan.  I know everyone on
Earth wants his time.  As you have seen, I'm a fairly entertaining
briefer (people don't go to sleep on me, anyway) and of course I
volunteer to put on a pro-space briefing if anything like that is ever
wanted.  I also realize this is not exactly likely.
        I don't want anything from the new administration: that is,
I'm not an office seeker.  I would like a point of entry for ideas
once in a while, and I would very much like to see that advisory study
group set up (and I want to stay on it).  And of course if there's a
need for my talents, I'm available.  I suppose you'd describe my
talents as being able to listen to a lot of people and understand a
diversity of disciplines; you'll recall I was the General Editor of
the PROJECT 75 BMD study (which was a frank copy of your PROJECT
FOECAST, but what the hell) and I was able to write about every
conceivable technology.  Having tooled up, I have been known to have
an idea or two.
        As you may know, Stefan and I are working on a book to be
called THE STRATEGY OF PROGRESS, which is an update of THE STRATEGY OF
TECHNOLOGY.
        This is long enough.  I do hope my paper proves useful.  If
you think it's "OK but---" I'm willing to listen to revision
suggestions.

Best,


Jerry Pournelle
Civilian Space Policy


A CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY FOR THE 1980'S

"Once to every man and nation
Comes the moment to decide."
        James Russell Lowell, Anglican Hymnal #519

        Ask the average American the precise moment when he last felt
really proud of the nation, and chances are high that he'll say "July
20, 1969, at about 4 PM Pacific Daylight Time."  Nearly everyone
remembers where he was on that day, and many have never lost the
thrill of that moment.  "Tranquility Base here.  The Eagle has
landed."
        A properly designed space policy could win back that lost
pride--and make a profit in the bargain.
        Until a few years ago, the US had a positive balance of
payments.  Our largest export was high technology.  Now our major
export is agricultural products.  We had technology for export because
we invested in technology; now we have used up that investment, and
there is no cutting edge to our technology development.
        NASA's most remarkable achievement may have been to make
mankind's greatest achievement look dull.  It is fashionable in
anti-technology circles to denigrate the benefits of the space
program.  "Teflon frying pans," the scoffers say; but in the real
world, we got computers, firefighting methods, medical instruments,
communications systems, technques for fabricating large glass fibre
structures, automated quality control procedures, and a host of other
things now taken for granted.
        Another benefit was development of a methodology for managing
the most complex task in human history.  Before Apollo, D-Day held
that record.
        Perhaps the most important benefit was recruiting bright young
men and women into science and engineering disciplines.  Space had
glamor, and many went to engineering schools in order to participate
in the space program.  Without such attractions, it becomes more
difficult to induce young people to undertake that arduous training
that modern technological leadership demands.
        It is clear that good high technology research does not
cost money.  You always get your money back.  Usually you make a large
profit.  A vigorous space program is important in high technology
development.
                        * * *
        In 1871, France lay prostrate, as Bismark erected his new
German Empire across the corpses of French dreams.  It would be hard
to exaggerate the depth of French despair.  Then, in 1889,
Alexandre-Gustav Eiffel built the tallest structure in the world; and
France had pride again.  The Eiffel tower wasn't useful, and at the
time it certainly wasn't thought pretty; but nothing remotely like it
had ever been done.  Twice as high as St. Peter's or the Great
Pyramid, built with almost contemptuous ease, it stood as a monument
to the new France, and remained as the tallest building in the world
until the completion of the Chrysler Building in 1930.
        In 1981, the United States does not lie prostrate, but many
citizens are demoralized because we have no sense of national purpose.
The American people have too often been told there is no solution to
the problems facing us; that we must share the misery and equitably
distribute the poverty, because we can do nothing else.
        This is nonsense; yet there is a grain of truth in the
counsels of despair.  So long as we live on Only One Earth, we must
inevitably come to the time when our non-renewable resources are gone.
In a small closed system such as a single planet, we may not agree on
the limits to growth--but we all must admit there ←are← limits.
        The Earth is just too small and fragile a basket for the human
race to keep all its eggs in.  Some day we will lose the Earth.
Probably not soon.  Cosmic disasters are inevitable, but the chances
that one will happen in any given century are fairly small.  Over the
long haul, though, we will lose the Earth, to a comet collision, or to
the exploding Sun, or to a new Ice Age, or to any of a dozen other
unlikely-sounding catastrophes.  By that time we ←must← be able to
survive without Earth.  History will bless the men and nation who took
the first steps to give humanity a home other than "Only One Earth."
                        * * *
        Last summer, I took part in a high-level NASA planning study
held at Pajaro Dunes near Santa Cruz.  For a full week some of the
most creative minds in the space community considered "bold new
missions for the 25-50 year time frame."  During the last two days,
Administrator Robert Frosch took part.
        I have recently been at JPL where I have been privileged to be
among the first humans on Earth to see detailed pictures of Saturn.
It was a thrilling experience.  It also provided me an opportunity to
confer with dozens of space experts from all over the nation.
Following that, I called colleagues across the country.  My question
was simple enough: what are the best things we can do in space?  What
should be our long-term goals, and what should we do this afternoon?
        A surprising consensus emerged.

        First: everyone agrees that the Halley Comet Intercept Mission
is worthwhile.  It is also ←URGENT←.  Unless some $20 million is put
into the FY82 budget, there is no chance that the mission can fly.
That $20 million buys an option to something unique in our lifetimes.
It would be silly not to take that option; if later you decide the
mission is not worthwhile, you can cancel it.
        The Halley Comet Mission is one of pure science.  There is no
likely commercial payoff, and very little research and development
will be done.  It is a relatively safe mission, well within JPL's
proven capabilities.  It is important largely because of the stimulus
it will give to the science teams.  In addition, the returns from the
mission will be spectacular, with high entertainment value for the
public.
        As an aside: one should not neglect the entertainment value of
space.  A full third of the projected benefits of Grand Coulee Dam
were "recreational".  At a ←per capita← cost lower than the price of
admission to a movie, the public gets a show that could not be bought
anywhere else.
        The Halley Mission will help demonstrate that we have not lost
our technological superiority to the Soviets--whose space spectaculars
will mature in the 1984-88 time frame.  It is well worth $20 million
to preserve the Halley option.
        The balance of the space program will cost a lot more.  The
investment is justified, but it is not small.  The outline below
presents both long-term and intermediate goals.

        1.  It is clear that we could have a Lunar colony within this
century; and that such a colony could be made self-sustaining.  There
is disagreement over when we could send up the first colonists--would
they be on the Moon before 1990--and, secondly, over when the colony
could become self-sustaining.  (Basic supplies such as power and
oxygen are plentiful on the Moon; but just how small can a closed
ecology be?)  A Lunar Colony makes a desirable long-term space goal,
because it makes use of the capabilities developed by Apollo; and it
has the intrinsic appeal of the settling of a new frontier.  It would
be an appreciable step toward insuring that no single accident or
disaster could exterminate the human race.
        2.  There is immense potential profit in space industries.  At
the moment, we know of no single space-made product that is
sufficiently profitable to support not only its costs of manufacture,
but also the "housekeeping" costs of a space station; but we do know
of at least a dozen products which would be profitable if the basic
space "industrial park" existed, so that the industry paid only its
own costs.
        If a space industrial facility existed, it would be
profitable; and it would bring private enterprise into space.
        3.  Building a space industrial facility gives us experience
in large orbital construction techniques.  These skills are vital for
both military and civilian space activities.
        4.  The industrial facility has already been designed by large
aerospace companies under the general title of "Space Operations
Facility."  This name has little power to inspire public acceptance.
The President of one of the larger Star Trek clubs suggests "Starbase
One".
        Aerospace engineers closely associated with the project are
agreed that construction of an operational space base is (given
operational Shuttle) a three to four year task; but that the
administrative and decision cycle of NASA as presently organized would
add at least three years to that.
        Starbase One could be minimally operational, with a crew
aboard, by Summer of 1984; and this can be accomplished without
wasteful crash programs.  This would require cooperation among
aerospace companies.
        Given intelligent management, there is no reason why Starbase
One could not be sufficiently complete to allow on-site inspection by
a high-ranking official in Fall of 1984.  Vice President Bush has been
suggested.
        5.  Starbase One would provide support for civilian industries
in space, but it is also a logical step toward construction of Lunar
colonies.  Indeed, once industries are well established in space, the
laws of physics dictate that we go to the Moon as the most economical
source of many raw materials including oxygen.  Thus the space
facility leads us toward a genuine escape from "Only One Earth"--but
without committing us to any kind of Lunar timetable.
        6.  The Soviet Union is certain to have a very large space
facility in operation by 1985; a facility much larger and probably
more spectacular than the proposed Starbase.  However, Starbase One
gives us at least a chance of countering the inevitable Soviet claims
to mastery of space (and to being the world's most powerful nation.)
Although one probably should not plan space missions solely to "beat
the Russians", the psychological effects on our diplomacy cannot be
ignored.
        Starbase One is, of course, an Earth-observation facility
which passes over the Soviet Union every two hours.  The Soviet
trawler fleet provided Soviet intelligence agencies with a great deal
of information; it also makes money from its fishing activities.
Starbase One could also aid intelligence while making profits.  Why
should the Russians have all the fun?
        7.  Construction of Starbase One is compatible with completion
of the Large Space Telescope by summer of 1984.  An orbital telescope
can provide photographs of Jupiter nearly as spectacular as those
sentback by the Voyager spacecraft.  It has big scientific utility
combined with lots of color and flash and public appeal.
        8.  In addition to Starbase One, we should immediately open a
program office for Solar Power Satellites.  This ought to be funded at
about $50 million a year.
        The Solar Power Satellite (SPS) system is, like nuclear
fusion, a "far-out" technology.  Unlike fusion, SPS is known to work.
It may not work economically, but it can't fail to produce
electricity.  Moreover, our best evidence to date is that SPS really
is competitive with other systems.  After all, coal will require some
5 billion tons a year before 2000--and we don't have the rail net to
carry it.  I have never seen firm estimates of the total cost of
coal--or any other "conventional" energy system, but if one takes into
account transport and environmental factors, the "incidental" costs
will not be small.  As an example, the sludges produced by stack gas
scrubbers are LARGER than the original coal put into the boiler;
disposal of all that cancerous stuff (stack-scrub sludge is really
horrible goo) cannot be cheap.
        SPS provides insurance against technological disaster.  SPS
←CAN← produce the electricity needed to run the country; it ←may← be
the cheapest way.  It is likely to be competitive in cost.  Best of
all, once we have the SPS option, we can ←know← that our worst
problems only cost money which we spend in our own country.  We don't
have to go to war or sell the nation on the installment plan.
        If we want SPS later, it is cheaper to start now; crash
funding is not only wasteful, but also detrimental.  There is a
maximum level a new start can absorb; after that, you're hiring
anything that walks up the steps.  Beginning a program office now will
save a great deal of money later if we go with the SPS option.  If we
do not buy SPS, the $50 million a year spent will not all be wasted,
since much will go for research.  It will prove to have been cheap
insurance.
        9.  SPS requires capability for construction of large devices
in orbit.  Starbase One develops that capability.  Thus Starbase One
contributes to the SPS option.
        10.  There are two routes to SPS.  The NASA "standard" study
spends some $25 billion (over 4-7 years) in research and development,
then invests some $50-60 billion in a fleet of Heavy Lift Vehicles
(HLV).  Thus the first SPS power station costs some $100 billion
dollars (and delivers about as much power as we presently get from
Grand Coulee Dam.)  The ←second← SPS will cost an additional $11
billion.  Each new SPS would be marginally cheaper, since we would
already have the Fleet of HLV and the R&D would be done.
        The other route has been proposed by David Criswell, formerly
of the Lunar and Planetary Institute (and winner of a Proxmire Golden
Fleece due to Criswell's commendable zeal for protecting the lunar
soil samples brought back by Apollo).  Dr. Criswell believes we can
build SPS with Shuttle, without the enormous investment in the HLV
Fleet.  His method envisions going to the Moon first and building SPS
largely from Lunar materials.
        The Criswell method has more risks than the "standard" SPS
program as envisioned by NASA.  It has some cost advantages, and of
course puts us on the Moon fairly early in the program.  It is an
option which ought to be studied.  Fortunately it costs very little to
keep the option alive.
        Note that Starbase One is a highly desirable step toward
building SPS on the Criswell plan; and that opening a $50 million/year
program office for SPS will let us examine both the HLV and the
Moon-first methods of building SPS.
        11.  The Pajaro Dunes misson planning study group produced
excellent results.  This group ought to be institutionalized: that is,
there are great advantages to periodic meetings of an ←outside←
advisory group composed in large part of people who are uninterested
in NASA jobs, and who get together at, say, semi-annual intervals.  It
should also have a semi-annual standing appointment with the NASA
Administrator.
        The Pajaro Dunes study was funded through the University of
Santa Clara, which provided support services and secretariat.  This is
an excellent system, in that it keeps bureaucratic involvement to a
minimum, and makes use of eager young people.
        Such a group, to include engineers, scientists, science
writers, and indeed science fiction dreamers, can do yoeman service at
almost trivial costs.
        You might even consider forming such a group to report yearly
to you on new developments in all fields of science and technology.
If nothing else you'd find it stimulating.  Many of us get paid pretty
well for our lectures and essays--meaning that someone out there finds
them entertaining as well as instructive.

        In conclusion: nothing is cheap; but our only chance to
improve productivity is to invest in new technology.  Technological
research needs a focus, a cutting edge to attract bright new people.
Space serves that role admirably.
        It is the historic mission of government to build roads to new
frontiers and protect early settlers.  This is as true in 1981 as it
was in 1781.
        You have a unique opportunity.  It may not come again to any
man or nation.

Space Policy--Appendix

NOTES ON NEEDED TECHNOLOGIES

J. E. POURNELLE, PH.D.


        1.  If we are to use Shuttle external tanks (for reference:
33505 kg., 47 x 8.38 meters dimension; capable of containing 20 PSI)
in a Space Operations Facility (Starbase One) we will need a system
for orbit shaping.  A space tug which remains in orbit is probably the
most efficient method for this.
        This implies development of capability for orbital refueling
operations; this is not all that hard to do, but it does take some
work.  The Soviets are reported to have such a capability.

        2.  One method of ←amplifying← human presence is with what
have come to be called Waldoes.  These are teleoperated machines;
machines whose operators are a long way off.  Waldoes in orbit--or on
the Moon!--allow a small number of humans to do a lot of work.
        Waldo technology has had some spectacular advances, but the
"hands" of the machines have not advanced in 30 years.  This is
unfortunate.  (Alvin, the submersible, still operates at enormous per
diem expense with two-fingered hands and truly horrible operator
controls; none of this is required, it's just that nobody has
developed the hands.)
        Thus hands for waldoes is a critical technology item (and
would be highly valuable anyway; what would a waldo inside the Three
Mile Island containment be worth?).  Best experts in this field are
Minsky of MIT and McCarthy of Stanford.
        There is a need for continuing general support of waldoos; but
the hands are the truly critical item.

        3.  We need to develop inflatable orbiting structures.  These
can be put inside Shuttle tanks.  The tank holds 10 PSI, and inside it
is an inflatable which holds 14.7 PSI.  We thus can use air, and a
blowout of the inflatable structure is no disaster; nor is a leak in
the tank, since the inflatable should be designed to hold 20 psi in
emergency conditions.
        Along with this we need quick-installation airlocks.

        4.  SKYLAB gave us a wealth of data on needed human factors
gear.  Little of this was done after SKYLAB.  It needs to be started
again.
        We will need a method for re-stocking orbiting installations
with food, water, and air.

        5.  The SPACE ACTIVITY SUIT, (Dr. Paul Webb, Webb Associates,
Yellow Springs, Ohio) needs to be developed.  This is a radical
concept: a suit which uses permeable nylon reinforcement to human skin
as the pressure wall.  The concept is known to work and in fact is a
proven technology; and one can do a lot more work in that kind of
suit.
        Present EVA suits are a dead end technology; Space Activity
Suits will make space construction jobs much simpler.

        6.  There are undoubtedly other key technologies which my top
of the head look hasn't identified; we need another Pajaro Dunes study
to look at the problem.  True, Boeing, Rockwell, and other major
aerospace firms have studied Space Operations Facility and space
station; but in my judgment, no one has looked at the concept from the
viewpoint of what is the best route to get it built, assuming
relaxation of some of the bureaucratic structure and traditional NASA
restraints.